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We analyze the appropriate size and implied profitability of a representative ethanol processing firm.
An analysis based on current processing technology and costs with typical conditions in Iowa product
and input markets is useful; because unit production costs have declined 30% in current dollars over
the last 15 years; and because discovering a suitable size for processing facilities has been an important
part of the cost-reducing process. We apply theoretical plant size rules for a conventional processing
business, an integrated producer/processor enterprise, and a processing cooperative. We also introduce
a spatial dimension for the corn inputmarket, because ethanol processing facilities can be uniquely large
among agri-processing enterprises. The analysis supports three conclusions. First, the most appropriate
size may still be larger than many of the recently constructed plants. Second, ethanol processing is a
profitable enterprise; for instance, we calculate a return on capital of 14% for a processing business
with optimal scale, current costs and technology, and typical market conditions. Third, total producer
plus processor profits can be improved moderately, about $0.04/bushel of corn processed, with an
integrated producer/processor enterprise; the producer enterprise sets the local corn price through
processing capacity, in a fashion that offsets some potential monopsony power.
Nous avons analyse´ la taille approprie´e et la rentabilite´ implicite d’une usine de transformation d’e´thanol
repre´sentative. Une analyse fonde´e sur la technologie de transformation et les couˆts actuels tenant
compte du marche´ des produits et des intrants en Iowa s’est re´ve´le´e utile e´tant donne´ que les couˆts de
l’unite´ de production ont diminue´ de 30% en dollars courants au cours des 15 dernie`res anne´es et que la
de´termination de la taille approprie´e des installations de transformation est un e´le´ment important du
processus de re´duction des couˆts. Nous avons applique´ les re`gles the´oriques concernant la taille dans le
cas d’une usine de transformation classique, d’une entreprise inte´gre´e de production-transformation et
d’une coope´rative de transformation. Nous avons e´galement pre´sente´ une dimension spatiale du marche´
de l’intrant de maı¨s, e´tant donne´ que la taille des installations de transformation d’e´thanol peut eˆtre
importante comparativement aux autres entreprises de transformation de produits agricoles. L’analyse
a permis de de´gager trois conclusions. Premie`rement, la taille la plus approprie´e pourrait bien eˆtre
supe´rieure a` celle de nombreuses installations re´centes. Deuxie`mement, la transformation de l’e´thanol
est une activite´ rentable; par exemple, nous avons calcule´ un rendement du capital de 14% pour une
entreprise de transformation exploitant a` une e´chelle optimale, avec une technologie et des couˆts actuels
optimaux et profitant des conditions du marche´ typiques. Troisie`mement, les be´ne´fices du producteur
et du transformateur peuvent augmenter le´ge`rement, d’environ 0,04 $/boisseau de maı¨s transforme´,
dans le cas d’une entreprise inte´gre´e de production−transformation; l’entreprise du producteur e´tablit
le prix du maı¨s local en fonction de la capacite´ de production de manie`re a` contrebalancer le pouvoir
de monopsone potentiel.
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INTRODUCTION
Enterprises in the growing U.S. ethanol industry have experimented with the scale and
organization of processing enterprises. In the first expansion of the late 1970s, agribusiness
processing firms constructed several largewetmillswith capacities ranging from100 to 350
million gallons per year (MGY). In contrast, farmer cooperatives (co-ops) constructed
small dry mills with a typical capacity of about 10MGY.New producer/processor plants,
constructed since 1995, are typically larger (e.g., 40 MGY). Some are co-ops while others
are profit-motivated. Agribusiness firms no longer build large and expensive wet mills,
because the corn oil, gluten meal, and gluten feed byproduct revenues no longer justify
the additional expense. However, some of their new dry mills (100 MGY) are larger than
most of the producer-owned plants.
Concern for the appropriate scale and organization underscores a broader issue of
the underlying profitability of ethanol processing. Current high energy prices may create
a favorable profit climate for ethanol processing. Further, recent technology advances
have reduced costs and improved processing yields. However, the ethanol industry did
experience a prolonged period of meager profits not so long ago. An enterprise with the
appropriate scale andorganization is an important element of a long-termcompetitiveness
strategy.
This investigation of ethanol scale, organization, and profitability builds on a repre-
sentative ethanol processing enterprise. We do apply the classical tradeoff between capital
costs and assembly costs in choosing the optimal scale of an agricultural processing en-
terprise that assembles a geographically dispersed input (Williamson 1962; Bressler and
King 1970), but we also consider a new processing industry locating in a region that
has a well-developed export market for the corn input. Further, we compare business
and producer-owned organizations for processing enterprises. Specifically, we look at the
scale choices for a conventional ethanol processing business, a co-op, and an integrated
producer-owned corn and ethanol processing enterprise.
We examine the plant size choice for a representative ethanol processing firm fac-
ing a typical economic environment in Iowa. The empirical content of the represen-
tative Iowa firm analysis includes recent surveys of operating costs, analyses of plant
cost–size relationships, and a study of actual corn input pricing in the vicinity of
some existing ethanol plants. Hence, we do shed some light on the profitability of a
well-scaled, well-organized ethanol processing firm that uses modern technology in the
current economic environment. Our results suggest that ethanol is a profitable invest-
ment, that most of the recently constructed dry mills are smaller than optimal, and
that one of the alternatives to a conventional processing business may choose a plant
size that improves the region’s economic surplus more than a conventional processing
business.
THEORY
Three aspects of the firm choice problem are analyzed. First, we review investment
theory in the context of an ethanol processing plant. While new ground is not broken,
a preliminary demonstration of the profitability of ethanol processing is provided, and
the advanced features of finance theory that are relevant to our problem are evaluated.
Second, we show how the classical plant scale problem for an agricultural enterprise can
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be imbedded in an appropriate finance theory. Specifically, we develop an optimal plant
scale rule for a processing business that purchases the bulky input in a corn market that
includes exporter competition.Third,weprovideplant scale rules for producer/processing
enterprises. Specifically, we develop the optimal plant scale rules for a processing co-
op and for an integrated corn processing enterprise, an organization chosen by many
producer-owned firms.
Investment Analysis for an Ethanol Processing Firm
Investment analysis builds on enterprise cash flow, which is the difference between rev-
enues and operating expenses. Processing corn into ethanol requires fixed proportions of
ethanol (Ye) and distillers grain (Yd) per unit of corn processed (Qct):
Qct units of corn →
{
Qet = YeQct units of distillers grain
Qdt = YdQct units of ethanol
Also, marginal processing costs for a fixed proportions process are constant, because
fixed proportions of noncorn inputs (labor, electricity, water, and processing chemicals)
are required for each unit of corn processed. Hence, the annual cash flow is defined in
terms of the processing margin (Mt), noncorn operating expenses (Cp), and the volume
of corn processed:
πt = MtQct − CpQct
where Mt = PetYe + PdtYd − Pct (1)
The processing margin defines a composite market price for processing one unit of corn.
It consists of a composite output price, and ethanol and distillers grain revenues per unit
of corn processed (PetYe and PdtYd), less the corn input price (Pct).
The ethanol processor is a price-taker in both of the product markets. There are
approximately one-hundred national firms in the U.S. ethanol market, and no one firm
has a dominant market share. Also, a large fraction of the U.S. output of distillers’ grain is
sold on the international proteinmarket. Further, themarket price of ethanol does provide
a socially desirable price signal for the plant investment problem, since the market price
reflects the social benefits of ethanol consumption.1
We also assume temporarily that the processor is a price-taker in the corn input
market. In the large, this is also a tenable assumption, since ethanol firms are small
compared to the scale of an integrated international corn market, but once the investment
framework is established, we will focus on the effects of price-setting in a local corn input
market on plant scale choices.
Investors seek to maximize the discounted value of the future cash flows less the
current cash outlay for the physical capital of the plant (K(Qct)).2 A “capitalized profits”
form of expected present value follows when expected profits and the anticipated rate of
price increase are known:
Vet = −K(Qct) + π et
/
r∗ (2)
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where the superscript “e” refers to the mathematical expectation of a variable. Implicitly,
a unit of corn used in the fixed proportions production process also requires one unit of
processing capacity, which is also measured in units of corn processed. The capital cost
function for the ethanol industry, K(Qct), is U-shaped (Gallagher et al 2005). In turn,
risk and the rate of product price increase define the adjusted real interest rate, r∗ (Dixit
and Pindyck 1994, p. 148; Brealey and Myers 2003, p. 197):
r∗ = r − α + φρσ (3)
where α is the anticipated percentage growth (0/1) in the product price (margin), r is the
nominal riskless interest rate,  is the market price of risk ( = 0.4; Dixit and Pindyck
1994, p. 148), ρ is the correlation between ethanol profits and the market portfolio, and
σ is the standard deviation of the percent change in the ethanol processing price.
The first order condition from the expected present value criterion Equation (2)
provides a rule for optimal capital expansion.3 In Tobin’s investment analysis, capacity
should increase until the capitalized value of the marginal investment divided by the
purchase cost, i.e., “q,” falls to unity (Dixit and Pindyck 1994, pp. 5, 420). Alternatively,
marginal profitability can be decomposed to obtain the familiar competitive pricing rule,
Mt = Cp + r∗ ∂K
∂Qct
(4)
that price equals marginal production cost. Here, marginal cost includes an operating
cost component and a capital cost component.
If there is a significant probability of low margins and plant closure, a modified
capital expenditure rule that includes the opportunity cost of investing today instead
of in the next period may be required (Pindyck 1988; Dixit and Pindyck 1994), but the
current technologymargin in Figure 1A exceeds the survey estimate of noncorn operating
costs for every year of the historical period, so analysis of plant closure is not urgent.
We considered option values in preliminary analyses, but concluded that conventional
criteria are sufficient. Detailed calculations of option values are available upon request.
Plant closure analysis may have been important in the past; a margin constructed with
technology and costs from 1985 (Figure 1B) gave a margin below operating costs for three
out of twenty years.
Dry mill ethanol processing is a profitable enterprise and a candidate for new plant
capital placement. Consider the three terms inEquation (4). On the left hand side (LHS), a
processing margin constructed with historical prices and today’s processing yields ranges
from$1.2/bu to $3.25/bu,with an average of $2.02/bu (Figure 1A).On the right hand side
(RHS), operating costs atCp= $1.1/buare considerably less than themargin inFigure 1A;
further, minimum average capital expenditures for a dry mill that processes 24 million
bushels per year (MBY) are $2.87/bu in current (2003) dollars (Gallagher et al 2005). So
the annual capital cost, the second RHS term in Equation (3), is $0.32/bu with an 11%
annual return. Hence, the sum of operating and capital cost, $1.42/bu, is considerably less
than the average margin, suggesting that ethanol plant investment is profitable. Nonethe-
less, consideration ofmarginal capital cost, risk, and spatial aspects of the corn input is still
required.
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Figure 1. (A) Corn processing margin with today’s technology and historical prices (B) Corn
processing margin with 1980’s technology and historical prices
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The Ethanol Processing Business in an Input Market with Exporter Competition
A plant capital scale rule for a processing business that accounts for the dispersed input
supply and significant farm-to-plant transport costs requires three elements: a profit
function that is redefined to include spatial costs, a specific relation between corn input
market area and the corn supply available at the plant, and the specification of corn
market price relationships in the local market area.
The enterprise profit function should reflect the spatial dimensions of the investment
problem, because ethanol processing facilities are uniquely large among grain processing
enterprises (Gallagher et al 2005, p. 138). Hence, we specify a model that binds plant size
together with determination of the local corn input market area. Further, the processing
firm becomes one buyer among many local farmers. Thus, corn price is no longer fixed
in the local market area. Instead, the processing firm has some ability to set prices in the
local market area through the plant capacity choice.
A convenient profit function for the agricultural processor has separate terms for
revenues (Ret ), corn costs (Ccb), and operating costs (Cp). Also, the connection between
corn processing capacity and market area (dt∗) is specified:
π et = (Ret − Cp)Qct − r∗K [Qct] − Ccb(Qct)
where
Ret = PetYe + PdtYd
and
Qct = Qc(d∗t ) (5)
The boundary of the market area (d∗t ) defines the corn input capacity that can be
sustained by the local input market area when the density of available supplies (e and y)
are given. The formula
Qc(d∗t ) = πd∗
2
t ey (6)
multiplies the market area inside a circle by the supply available in a typical unit of area.
For instance, a market boundary of d∗t = 25 miles and a supply uniformly distributed in
space with corn supply density e = 75 acre/mi2 and yield y = 150 bu/acre will sustain
a processing plant with a capacity of Qc = 22 × 106 bushels annually. In practical
applications, this physical relationship is used in conjunction with a constant cost/break
even point model of farm supply, and the estimated “e” reflects the excess supply of
corn available to the processing industry after meeting the needs of local livestock and
inventories.
We do assume an early stage of processing industry development, where firms usually
choose nonoverlapping market areas (Greenhut et al 1987, p. 263). Investing ethanol
firms typically site new plants where direct competition with another plant will not occur,
according to our interviews.
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The location of the market boundary depends on the presence of competitors for
the corn input near the processing plant. For Von Thunnen’s isolated central market
place, there is no external competition. Then the boundary is defined by producers’
average variable costs (C0) for corn plus freight costs to the market, because farmers pay
the freight and are unable to earn profits or land rents when the market price does not
exceed production plus marketing costs (Chisholm 1979, p. 15). Areas surrounding Iowa’s
ethanol plants operated by conventional businesses also tend to end up with delivered,
or cargo, insurance, and freight (CIF) pricing rules, but they compete in a region that
also exports grain. Then the processor pays the farmer the shipping cost the processor
avoids by not obtaining the corn for the export price at the market boundary (Gallagher
et al 2005, p. 121–122, Case B). Thus, the corn price at the processing site (Pct) equals an
exporter’s bid price at the market area boundary (Pot) plus the transport rate associated
with shipping from the market boundary (td∗t ):
Pct = Pot + td∗t (7)
That is, the processor pays all farmers the same delivered price as for corn obtained at
the boundary of the market area and shipped to the plant, but no more. The short-haul
transport rate, t, is usually expressed as $/bu/mile. Thus, the net price to a farmer at
distance dt from the plant is the site price less transport charges, which decline as distance
from the processing plant increases.
In turn, corn costs for a processing business are defined by the price–distance
function:
Ccb =
∫ d∗t
dt=0
[Pot + td∗t ](2πdt)eydt (8)
where td∗t is the transport cost for shipping the corn from themarket boundary and export
point to the plant site. Derivation of the algebraic form of Equation (8) and appropriate
derivatives are given in Appendix A (Section I).
Plant scale is optimized when corn, operating and capital costs offset the incremental
revenues from plant expansion. Substituting the corn cost and market area functions into
the profit function Equation (5) and the present value Equation (2), and differentiating
with respect to d∗t , yields a capital expansion/pricing rule with a spatial dimension:
Ret − Cp = r∗
∂K
∂Qct
+ ∂Ccb
∂Qct
where
∂Ccb
∂Qct
= Pot + (3/2)d∗t t (9)
Equation (9) still recommends a balance between incremental revenues and production
costs for highest profits, but marginal corn cost is now a function that depends on
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transport cost and the market boundary, instead of an exogenous price. Equation (9) is a
plant scale rule suitable for the subsequent empirical analysis of ethanol processing.
Return Maximizing Co-op
Consider a processing co-op that maximizes the total returns to members. Also assume
that all producers in the input market area become members. The objective function of
this enterprise is processed product revenues less processing costs less farm producer costs
(Royer 2001, p. 4). Essentially, this means maximizing the sum of producer and processor
profits. Adding the spatial dimension, the net processing and crop production return for
a unit of corn located dt miles from the plant is
N(dt) = (Ret − Cp) − r∗
K [Qc(d∗t )]
Qc(d∗t )
− (Co + dt t) (10)
because an individual’s distance from the plant defines his transport costs. That is, corn
producer-members are paid net processing revenues less the average capital cost, corn
production costs, and actual transport costs to the processing plant. The net return could
be obtained using two payments. The processor first reimburses corn producers for crop
production and transport charges that are specific to an individual’s location. Later, the
processor distributes all earnings, using the equation above and an individual’s location as
a guide. Notice that a producer pays transport costs based on his actual distance from the
plant (dt), while he pays average capital costs based on the enterprise’s choice of market
boundary (d∗t ).
The total surplus to all plant members with a given market boundary, d∗t , is
4
	(d∗t ) = (Ret − Cp)Q(d∗t ) − r∗K [Q(d∗t )] − Ccp(d∗t )
where
Ccp =
∫ d∗t
dt
[Co + tdt](2πdt)eydt (11)
The corn cost equation for the integrated producer/processor is defined by the “initial
payment” that the enterprise makes to individual farmers, Pct = Co + tdt, which is the
actual resource cost of the corn. Derivation of the corn cost equation and its derivatives
is given in Appendix A.
To find the optimal scale of this combined producer/processor enterprise, differen-
tiate the objective function (11) with respect to d∗t to obtain:
Ret − Cp = r∗
∂K
∂Qct
+ ∂Ccp
∂Qct
where
∂Ccp
∂Qct
= Co + d∗t t (12)
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Equation (12) is a suitable plant scale equilibrium rule for the integrated pro-
ducer/processor enterprise.
Our hypothetical enterprise combines elements of a co-op and an integrated corn
processing business. The co-op’s “business-at-cost” principle motivates a corn payment
of production plus transport cost that reflects the actual resource cost and, therefore,
provides the appropriate supply-inducing price for the plant scale decision. Also, a co-op
could accommodate annual capital payments at the market cost of capital to the firm
by making payments to equity, borrowing from members, or borrowing from a bank.
Co-op usually have difficulty in obtaining conventional financing, and raise capital using
retained patronage refunds instead (Cobia and Brewer 1989, pp. 247–249). The private
enterprise “maximum profit” principle guides the capacity and market area decisions,
using joint profits from corn production and processing.
Finally, we assume that all producers in the input market area become members and
provide their corn to the co-op processing enterprise, “all” referring to production in
excess of on-farm feed needs. Producers will have an incentive to provide their production
for processing if the corn cost reimbursement and corn processing return payment exceeds
the price for export marketing. Persistent excess returns for processing would likely sway
producers in a potential area toward complete conversion to processing. However, initial
participation rates could be lower in a dynamic choice model that balances a long-run
supply commitment against short-run marketing of corn to the export market, accounts
for initial uncertainty about long-run net benefits, and considers the risk of price fluc-
tuation in the grain export market. In short, the assumption of high levels of producer
participation in processor supply agreements is tantamount to a demonstrated long-term
profit advantage for committing capital to the processing enterprise.
Open Co-op
The open co-op does business at cost. In general, the open co-op expands until the net
average revenue product—revenues less operating and capital costs per bushel processed—
equals the supply price for the input (Helmburger and Hoos, 1962, p. 285). Also, suppose
that the co-op pays the same price to all members for corn delivered to the processing
plant, regardless of their location, then the private corn cost function, Ccb, describes the
co-op’s input expenditures. Consequently, the co-op’s equilibrium condition requires that
(Ret − Cp) − r∗
K(Qct)
Qct
= (Po + td∗t ) (13)
That is, the open co-op will expand plant capacity and market area up to the point where
plant net operating revenues less annual capital costs balance expenditures on corn input.
On the LHS, the average revenue for an incremental bushel of grain capacity is adjusted
downward for operating cost and the average annual cost of capital. The average input
expenditure for the grain input,Ccb(d∗t )/Q(d
∗
t ), is given in its simplified form on the RHS
(see Appendix A, Section I).
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COST, TECHNOLOGY, AND MARKET ENVIRONMENT
FOR A REPRESENTATIVE ETHANOL PROCESSOR
Today’s cost, technology, and market environment are used for the analysis of ethanol
processing. The local corn input market resembles Iowa during 2003. The evaluation also
incorporates a discount rate that reflects ethanol’s financial risk and growth potential.
The parameters characterizing an Iowa ethanol firm’s external environment are given in
Table 1. These estimates of exogenous factors are based on recent studies of costs and
technologies, and historical averages for market prices. Sources for our estimates of the
current situation are reviewed below. Also, moderate improvements in several factors
have combined for a substantial improvement in the conditions of ethanol processing
over the last two decades. Thus, we also describe the source and extent of improvements
in processing yields, operating costs, and capital costs.
Corn processing revenues are expressed per unit of corn processed. They are the
composite of prices and yields for ethanol and distillers’ grains. We use time series average
prices for ethanol and distillers’ grain, so that occasional periods of high and low prices
are taken into account without undue weight. Survey values are used for ethanol and
distillers’ grain yields. It is important that current ethanol yields are now 10% higher
than a decade ago because fiber conversion to ethanol is now possible (Piccataggio and
Finkelstein 1996). The yield improvement of the last decade has increased revenues by
$0.31/bu, when valued using the 1984–2003 average of ethanol and DDG prices.
Similarly, noncorn operating expenses in dry mills have declined by 48% in current
dollars or $0.38/bu since the late 1980s (Shapouri et al 2002, p. 7). The sources of the
decline are improved energy efficiency, automation that reduced labor use, and patent ex-
piration that reduced enzyme cost. Two surveys suggest that noncorn operating costs have
remained stable over the most recent five-year period, because adoption of cost-reducing
technologies offsets rising natural gas prices. We use Cp = $1.1/bu to approximate non-
corn operating costs of a typical dry mill, according to industry average data from the
most recent USDA survey (Shapouri and Gallagher 2005).
Table 1. Parameter values chosen for Iowa case study
Variable Value/Units Description
Ye 2.6662 gallons/bushel corn Ethanol yield
Yd 17.5 lbs/bushel corn Distillers’ grain yield
r∗ 0.11 (in 0/1 percent) Risk and inflation adjusted discount rate
Re $4.18/bushel corn Ethanol and byproduct revenues, in $/bu
Cp $1.10/bushel corn Noncorn ethanol processing costs, in $/bu
Co $1.75/bushel corn Iowa variable costs for corn production, 2003 trend value
from a 1990–2003 regression
po $2.16/bushel corn Iowa corn price at market area boundary, approximated by
the state average corn price from 1984 to 2003
t $0.0025/bushel/mile Short-haul rate for truck transport
y 154.73 bushel/acre Iowa corn yield, 2003 trend value
e 51.43 acre/mile Average corn density in Iowa’s ethanol processing area
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The capital outlay per bushel of processing capacity has also declined since the
1980s. As the typical size of a farmer-owned dry mill increased from 4 MBY in the
1980s to 19 MBY today, the average capital outlay for a bushel of capacity declined
by nearly 44% in current dollars, according to an estimate of the relationship be-
tween average capital costs and capacity provided by Gallagher et al (2005, p. 569).
We use the quadratic function from this study, adjusted to current (2003) dollars, for our
analysis:
K(Qct)
Qct
= α − βQct + γQc2t (14)
where α = 6.508, β = 0.3004, and γ = 0.006175. According to this estimate and us-
ing r∗ = 0.11, the annual interest cost for a unit of fixed plant capital cost has de-
clined about $0.27/bu since 1980, as producers have discovered a more appropriate
scale.
The conditions facing processors in Central or Eastern Iowa are reflected in our corn
market assumptions. For the corn cost function, an actual market area typically extends
about d∗t = 40 miles from the plant. Also, the local market rate for truck transport is t =
$0.0025/bu/mi, and processors tend to use CIF pricing (Gallagher et al 2005, pp. 128,
133). Finally, an average of Iowa’s corn price approximates the corn price at the boundary
of a typical market area: (Rw − Cp)Qc − r∗K(Qc) = CCb.
An adjusted discount rate should correct for risk and changing commodity prices.
We obtain a real interest rate of r∗ = 11% by summing the long-term average of the
riskless interest rate (8%), plus a risk premium (7%), less the anticipated rate of increase
in ethanol prices (4%).
For the riskless return component, we use the interest rate on a 10-year note issued
by the U.S. government, because the asset length corresponds roughly to the expected
life of the plant. The recent lows below 4%, however, seem overly generous. The 40-year
average rate of 8% defines representative investment conditions and more conservative
profitability assessments.
An ethanol investment should demand risk compensation by some measures of risk.
For instance, ethanol price variability, measured by the standard deviation of margin
changes at 24.3%, is higher than many commodities and considerably higher than man-
ufactured goods (Bodie and Rosanski 1980). Accordingly, preliminary estimations of a
market risk premium for ethanol used the capital asset pricing model (Brealey andMyers
2003, p. 167). The return on equity for agriculture was considered as the market portfolio
for β estimation of individual enterprise returns. Regressions with the annual return on
equity for the U.S. agriculture sector as the independent variable and annual ethanol re-
turns on capital, gave β = −0.27, or a correlation between agriculture returns and ethanol
returns of ρae = −0.15. Ethanol returns were calculated with historical margin data, cost,
and capital outlay surveys. Similar results occurred using a more conventional S&P 500
market portfolio with ethanol returns: β = −0.42 and ρ se = −0.06.
Strictly speaking, the negative correlation suggests that adding ethanol to an agri-
cultural or S&P 500 portfolio may actually reduce the variability of returns. In fact,
the portfolio variance (σ 2) is related to the variance of agricultural assets (σ 2a), the
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variance of the ethanol asset (σ 2e), the correlation between agricultural and ethanol assets
(ρa,e), agriculture’s portfolio proportion (xa), and ethanol’s portfolio proportion (xe), as
follows:
σ 2 = x2aσ 2a + x2eσ 2e + 2ρaexaxeσaσe (15)
We estimate σ a = 0.089, using sector data from the 1950–2003 period. We estimate σ e =
0.143 using ethanol margin and cost data from the 1983–2003 period. The estimate ρae =
−0.15 uses the time period common to both series. With these estimates, additional incre-
ments of ethanol will actually reduce the variability of a balanced agricultural portfolio
until ethanol’s portfolio share reaches 40%.
Nonetheless, we do add a substantial risk premium to the riskless interest rate; we
added the highest risk premium estimated for all classes of manufacturing industries
(Brealey and Myers 2003, p. 182). The 7% risk premium from the aircraft industry is a
starting point for ethanol profitability analysis, since both industries are highly cyclical
and subject to government policy change.
For comparison, we also estimated the ethanol risk premium using mean-variance
analysis, the certainty equivalence principle, and an estimate of the financial market’s
implicit risk preference. The details of this risk analysis are available from the authors,
but Figure 2 summarizes the estimations for various levels of ethanol’s share in the
investor’s portfolio. A risk premium of 1.5% to 2% is appropriate when ethanol’s share is
near zero. One to 1.25% applies when ethanol’s share is near 40%, and 4 to 5.2% should
be added to the riskless interest rate when ethanol consumes the entire portfolio. Indeed,
the aircraft industry approximation is a conservative upper limit.
Lastly, investment analyses based on current profits and real interest rates require an
estimate of anticipated increases in commodity prices. There are prospects for increasing
ethanol prices (margins). Ethanol should maintain its share of the additives market even
with steadily growing gasoline demand priced from $25/bbl oil. Also, ethanol’s premium
over commodity gasoline should increase due to health-related bans on substitute ad-
ditives (Gallagher et al 2003). Using estimates of the likely increase in ethanol margins
over the next 15 years gives an annual growth rate in the ethanol margin of 4%, i.e.,
α = 0.04.5
PLANT SCALE AND ECONOMIC SURPLUS CALCULATIONS
Table 2 summarizes the plant scale, cost, market area, and profit associated with each
organization of the ethanol processing enterprise. Iowa prices, costs, and processing yields,
given in Table 1, define the economic environment for ethanol processing.
The plant size, cost, and market area estimates of Table 2 are based on the rules
derived earlier; for plant size andmarket area, see Equation (9) for the processing business,
Equation (12) for the producer/processing enterprise, and Equation (13) for the open
processing co-op. The capital expenditures are calculated using Equation (14), with the
appropriate plant scale estimate. Corn cost is calculated using Equation (8) or (11), as
appropriate.
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Figure 2. Ethanol risk premium
Most of the relationships for the profit estimates were also given previously. Process-
ing profits for the business and the co-op are both givenbyEquation (5), althoughdifferent
values for the market boundary are used for each case. Farmer profits for the business and
co-op use similar revenue and cost functions with different market boundaries (see Table
2, note (l) and note (n)). The total sector profit for the business and co-op are the sum of
producer and processor components. In contrast, Equation (11) defines the total profit
for the integrated enterprise. Then the producer profit is estimated as an opportunity
cost, which is the return that farmers would earn by selling at the export price through-
out the region, paying production costs, and avoiding local transportation (see Table 2,
note (m)).
The processing business model calls for a capacity investment of 33.4 million bushels.
Meanwhile, the joint producer/processor model suggests a slightly larger capacity of 39.1
million bushels. The processing co-op model gives the largest capacity, at 51.2 million
bushels. This same ordering of enterprises ranks processor profits from highest to lowest;
the average return on capital, obtained by dividing processors’ profits by capital expen-
ditures, is 13.6% for the processing business, 9.2% for the integrated producer/processor
firm, and zero for the processing co-op. The producer profit ranking is inverted; the pro-
cessing co-op is highest at $23.95 million, the integrated producer/processor enterprise is
next at $16.8 million, and the processing business is lowest with $15.4 million.
However, joint producer/processor profits are the appropriate indicator for overall
welfare. Total surplus, the sum of producer and processor surpluses, is 5% higher with
the integrated producer enterprise than the total surplus with the processing business.
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Table 2. Estimated plant capacity and market area choices
Organization
Joint return Open
Processing maximizing processing
Variable Units business co-op co-op
Corn input mil bu 33.38a 39.11b 51.20c
Corn cost mil $ 75.15d 70.23e 116.39f
Capital expenditure mil $ 112.59g 164.99h 375.58i
Market radius miles 36.54a 39.55b 45.25c
Profit
Processors mil $ 15.27j 15.25 0.00k
Producers mil $ 15.37l 16.81m 23.95n
Total mil $ 30.64 32.07a 23.95
Return on capital Percent 13.6% 9.2% 1.0%
aEquation (9) with d∗ = 36.54.
bEquation (12) with d∗ = 39.55.
cEquation (13) with d∗ = 45.25.
dCcb with d∗ = 36.54. See Appendix A, Section (I).
eCcp with d∗ = 39.55. See Appendix A, Section (II).
fCcb with d∗ = 45.25. See Appendix A, Section (I).
gEquation (14) with d∗ = 36.54.
hEquation (14) with d∗ = 39.55.
iEquation (14) with d∗ = 45.250.
jEquation (5) with d∗=36.54
kEquation (5) with d∗=45.25
lRfb – CoQc(d∗t ) using d
∗ = 36.54. See Appendix C, Section (III).
m(Po – Co)Qc(d∗t ) using d
∗ = 39.55.
nRfb – CoQc(d∗t ) using d
∗ = 36.54. See Appendix C, Section (III).
Similarly, total surplus in the integrated enterprise is about 30% higher than the surplus
of the processing co-op.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper looks at the appropriate scale and implied profitability of ethanol processing,
using current conditions for technology and costs with typical product-market conditions,
in a major ethanol-processing region of the United States. The optimal decision rules pre-
sented for plant capital investment are also shapedby joint producer–exporter competition
in the local corn input market. Simulations estimate the plant scale choices and prof-
itability implications of a well-organized processing business, a joint producer/processor
enterprise, and a processing co-op.
Our plant scale estimates for all organization types for dry mills are higher than
the actual size of most new dry mills. The estimates for the processing business and
producer/processor enterprise, 35 and 41 MBY of corn (91 and 108 MGY of ethanol),
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respectively, are larger than most of the new dry mills—new dry mills usually process
20MBY of corn (produce 50MGY of ethanol).6 The capacity estimate for the processing
co-op is 50% larger than the estimate for the processing business.
There are some plausible reasons for overestimation of plant scale. For example, there
may be a risk-based underinvestment if investors cannot diversify their risks, the banking
sector demands a risk premium that exceeds our risk adjustment, or the diversification
benefits of a moderate ethanol investment are not understood. Also, the United States
Environmental ProtectionAgency’s emission standards limited drymills to about one-half
of their optimal scale until recently. However, emission control technology has improved,
and the size of some of the newest plants does correspond to our optimal scale estimates.
The gap between the estimated and actual plant scale for the processing co-op is the
widest, which may be related to the well-known difficulty associated with co-op financing
of capital-intensive enterprises.
The simulations confirm that an optimally scaled ethanol plant, operated as a pro-
cessing business or producer-owned enterprise with resource conditions similar to those
of Iowa in 2003 is profitable. An earlier study questioned ethanol’s potential for cost
reduction and profitability (Kane et al 1989), but the actual processing cost reductions
and technology-based revenue improvements of the last two decades have, in fact, been
substantial; a 30% reduction in overall production costs has occurred. Nonetheless, the
density of corn supply may still be insufficient to exploit economies of plant size in some
other areas of the United States (Gustafson 2002).
The joint producer/processing enterprise provides the largest net benefit (producer
plus processor surplus) for the area near the plant. The total areawelfare is 5%higherwhen
a representative producer/processor enterprise invests instead of a processing business. It
is known that a joint producer/processing enterprise maximizes total welfare when the
processor has potential monopsony power in the input market and takes prices in the
product market (Royer 2001, p. 6). We show that setting the corn price through plant
capacity choice is still moderately important in a local corn market, even when processors
use CIF plant pricing and when export competition for the local corn supply is present.
Separately, the total benefit improvement associated with producer-owned processing
($0.04 per bushel of corn processed) is not overwhelming, but it is comparable to the
other component processing cost or technology improvements that have added up to a
substantial improvement in ethanol processing returns.
The joint producer/processing organization is a hypothetical enterprise that com-
bines business and co-op elements. It returns the joint corn production/processing sur-
plus to members, pays for capital at the market cost, and secures a high participation
rate among local farmers. This ideal situation does provide a benchmark for understand-
ing the causes and remedies for underinvestment in value-added enterprises, but actual
producer-owned ethanol businesses in the United States may or may not have an or-
ganization conducive to optimal scale. The general proposition that co-op can improve
vertical coordination appears elsewhere (Schrader 1989, p. 128). Our result is a special
case of this general proposition.
Based on profitability, continued ethanol processing investments should and will
likely be considered by the private sector. Investments in larger plants, near 39 MBY,
should be considered for highest profitability. Investors should also consider enterprises
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that include joint producer and processor activities, especially when plant expansion
decisions are based on the resource cost of the corn input. Initial producer payments for
corn costs should include production cost plus location-specific transportation charges.
Public interventions aimed at better resource allocation might encourage continued
ethanol processing investments. Perhaps, incentives for integrated producer/processor en-
terprises should be considered. Otherwise, investment incentives for processing businesses
or co-ops might stem investment in undersized plants. Finally, public education about
ethanol’s diversification benefits in the financialmarketplacemight stemover-discounting
for risk.
NOTES
1Somedoargue that clean air regulation and the consumption subsidy for ethanol distort themarket,
so that the ethanol price exceeds its social benefit in consumption. However, environmental benefits
associated with ethanol consumption include replacement of the carcinogens benzene and lead,
reduced carbonmonoxide from combustion, and improved (reduced) global warming (Conway and
Erbach 2004, p. D2). As a first approximation then, these demand-shifting policies should remain
for normative analysis of ethanol competitiveness. However, empirical measurement of external
benefits and determination of the optimal set of policy instruments still deserves investigation.
2In general, the value of the plant investment is the discounted value of future cash flows less the
current outlay for the physical capital of the plant: Vt = −K(Qct) +
∑
i πt+i/(1 + r )i
3The first order condition from the expected present value criterion Equation (2) is
∂Vet
∂Qct
= ∂Kt
∂Qct
+ ∂π
e
t
∂Qct
1
r ∗
= 0 (15)
Rearranging gives the ratio form of the profit condition:
qt =
∂π et
∂Qct
1
r ∗
∂K
∂Qct
= 1
4To see this, add all corn units at each distance from the plant:
	(d∗t ) =
∫ d∗
d=0
[Re − Cp − r ∗ K [Qc(d
∗
t )]
Qc(d∗t )
− (Co + dtt)]2πdeydt (13)
Separating terms gives:
	(d∗t ) = (Re − Cp)Q(d∗t ) − r ∗K [Q(d∗t )] −
∫ d∗
d=0
[Co + dtt]2πdteydt (14)
Total corn cost for the integrated processing enterprise is the third term Cc=
∫ d∗
d=0 [Co + dtt]2πdt
eydt, which is evaluated in Appendix A (Section II).
5Alternatively, the 11% overall discount rate is consistent with a 3% risk adjustment, if the 4%
adjustment for anticipated ethanol price increases is removed. More precise estimates of ethanol’s
discount rate and risk premium in future research might also explore arbitrage pricing theory
(Brealy and Meyers 2003, pp. 177–181).
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6The capacity data for old and new ethanol plants is summarized by Gallagher et al (2005, p. 569).
Also, see Bryan (2003).
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APPENDIX A. DERIVATION OF CORN COST FUNCTIONS
For the cost–distance relationship, notice that the production obtained from a ring of a
given distance from the plant is given by the product of the circumference of the circle,
the width of the ring, and the density of corn: Qc = (2πd) (ey) d. Then the marginal
cost of expanding the outer circle by the incrementd is given byC’(d) = P(d) (2πd)(ey).
P(d) is a general price gradient function describing the price–distance surface. In general,
the total cost function is Ccz =
∫ d∗t
dt=0 P(dt)(2πdt)eydt, f orz = b, p.
I. In the case of the processing firm that buys its corn input in the presence of
exporters, the corn cost function becomes Ccb =
∫ d∗t
dt=0 [Pot+td∗t ](2πdt)eydt.
It is important to realize that the d
∗
t in the price function is a constant for the
mechanics of integration because it is the upper limit of the definite integral. Hence, the
integral becomes
Ccb = (ey)[Pot + td∗t ][2π ]
∫ d∗t
dt=0
dtdt = Potπd∗2t ey + tπd∗3t ey
So, ∂Ccb
∂d∗t
= 2Potπd∗t ey + 3tπd∗2t ey. Also ∂Qc∂d∗t = 2πd
∗
t ey, from Equation (6).
Hence, the marginal corn cost with respect to expanding the plant’s capacity is given
by dividing the above two partial derivatives: ∂Ccb
∂Qc = Pot + (3/2)td∗t .
The average corn cost with respect to expanding the plant’s capacity is given by
dividing Ccb by Equation (6):
Ccb(d∗t )
Qc(d∗t )
= Pot + td∗t .
II. In the case of the combined producer/processing firm, the general price gra-
dient function becomes P(dt) = Co + tdt. So, the corn cost function becomes Ccp =∫ d∗t
dt=0 [Cot+tdt](2πdt)eydt.
Now, the variable dt in the price function is a variable for themechanics of integration.
Hence, the integral becomes
Ccp = (2π )(Cot)(ey)
∫ d∗t
dt=0
dtdt + (2π )(t)(ey)
∫ d∗t
dt=0
d2t dt+ = Cotπd∗2t ey + (2/3)tπd∗3t ey
So, ∂Ccp
∂d∗t
= 2Cotπd∗t ey + 2tπd∗2t ey. Also, ∂Qc∂d∗t = 2πd
∗
t ey, from Equation (6).
Hence, the marginal corn cost with respect to expanding the plant’s capacity is given
by dividing the above two partial derivatives: ∂Ccp
∂Qc = Cot + td∗t .
ETHANOL PROCESSING 81
The average corn cost with respect to expanding the plant’s capacity is given by
dividing Ccb by Equation (6):
Ccp(d∗t )
Qc(d∗t )
= Cot + (2/3)td∗t .
Also, see Gallagher and Johnson (1999, p. 117) for a derivation of this average cost
function.
III. In the case of the farmer selling to the processing firm, the general price
gradient for the farm price at a particular location becomes (Gallagher et al 2005,
p. 122): Pf (dt) = Po + td∗t − tdt. So the farm revenue function becomes Rfb =∫ d∗t
dt=0 [Po + td∗t − tdt](2πdt)eydt.
Now, the variable dt in the price function is a variable for integration while
d∗t is a constant. Hence, the integral becomes Rfb = (2π )(Po + td∗t )(ey)
∫ d∗t
dt=0 dtdt −
(2π )(t)(ey)
∫ d∗t
dt=0 d
2
t dt = Potπd∗2t ey + (1/3)tπd∗3t ey. Also producer profits are π f = Rfb
− CoQc(d∗t ).
